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INTRODUCTION 
The oceans of the world are the free 
world lifelines. Operational mobility for 
free world naval and air forces is being 
drastically reduced by encroachments 
on the high seas by nation-states in a 
unilateral try at extending territorial 
waters in various ways. The purpose of 
this study is to review the efforts of 
certain nations to try to extend their 
internal and territorial waters through 
a unique method of measurement 
referred to as the archipelago concept 
or archipelago theory of territorial 
waters. This not only restricts severely 
the mobility of the fleets but also 
greatly narrows the commerce and free 
trade routes of the world and is thus 
limiting upon all nations, large and 
small, rich and poor. 
The legal status of the unilateral 
declarations by Indonesia and the Phil-
ippines is reviewed in this paper. The 
U.S. position established in connection 
with the archipelago concept through 
decisions of the courts, by legislation, 
and by diplomatic action is reported. 
The present status of the archipelago 
concept so far as can be determined by 
the decisions of the International Court 
of Justice and by the international 
conventions is carefully surveyed. The 
opinions of international lawyers 
writing on this subject are also covered. 
The necessary future action of the 
United States seems clear, and the sug-
gested procedure is set forth in this 
thesis. 
I-BACKGROUND 
The Seas Are Our Strength. The 
freedom of navigation on the high seas 
means the essential liberty of maritime 
transportation. The importance of 
mobility which the seas provide us was 
eloquently stated by Hanson W. Bald-
win as follows: 
The days of isolation are 
ended: the world needs us; we 
need the world. Our strategic con-
cept must meet a threat as varied 
and as complex as any in our 
history. If we would lead from 
strength, we must emphasize 
those elements of power in which 
we excel: our developed economy 
and great wealth, our industrial 
power and our technological ex-
pertise, our sea and air power, and 
our nuclear delivery capability. 
We must utilize the great waters 
and the skies and space above us 
for the flexibility and mobility 
which the United States, more 
than any other world power, can 
exploit. 1 
Certainly today seaborne mobile 
forces remain the key to any eonsidera-
tion of land hostilities-in offense or in 
defcnse. Since the United States is a 
seapower-a maritime nation-and Russia 
is basically a land-locked nation, the 
U.S.S.R. would like to see the United 
States dcnied as much as possible the 
frecdom of the use of the great oeean 
highway covering three fourths of the 
earth's surface. Russia and its satellites as 
well as some of the new and irresponsible 
nations would favor limiting the high seas 
in any way conceivable. The archipelago 
concept just happens to be another en-
croachment on the high seas that favors 
the Russian philosophy. 
Freedom of the Seas: History and U.S. 
Position. The historical record of free-
dom of the seas is familiar. The oceans of 
the world were at one time claimed for 
exclusive use of a limited number of 
states. Venice, Denmark, and England 
claimed broad rights over portions of the 
high seas during the medieval period. The 
promulgation of Papal Bulls of 1493 
purported to demarcate Portuguese 
righ ts t<1 the east and Spanish rights to the 
west of an imagina7 line 100 leagues 
west of the Azores. Hugo Grotius, a 
Dutch jurist, subsequently rationalized 
the freedom of the seas on the ground 
that since the sea was not divisible it 
could not be appropriated to individual 
use from the common ownership of 
mankind.3 Concern for the more general 
interest of the whole community of 
states ultimately succeeded in freeing the 
larger expanse of the oceans for relatively 
unhampered use of all.4 
After a prolonged balancing of inter-
ests between coastal states and other 
states of the world community as to 
authority on the seas, the principles of 
the freedom of the seas and of a narrow 
breadth of territorial sea became ac-
cepted. By 1900 the three-mile or one-
league limit had been positively adopted 
or acknowledged as law by 20 of the 21 
states which claimed or acknowledged a 
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territorial sea at that time. In the period 
from 1930 onwards the permitted extent 
of this narrow breadth of territorial sea 
has been in increasing controversy, 
largely because of concern for access to 
fisheries and because of danger, from a 
security standpoint, of permitting the 
blocking-off of large areas of water as 
territorial sea.5 
The United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea concluded at Geneva 
on 28 April 1958 adopted four interna-
tional conventions on the law of the sea. 
The United States joined with Canada in 
proposing a six-mile territorial sea and an 
additional six-mile exclusive fishing zone. 
This proposal was submitted to the 14th 
Plenary Meeting on 25 April 1958. 6 The 
proposal narrowly missed obtaining the 
necessary two-thirds majority. While this 
proposal indicated that the United States 
was prepared to depart from its tradi-
tional adherence to the three-mile limit in 
order to aehieve conference agreement, 
Arthur H. Dean, chairman of the Ameri-
can delegation, made it clear that the" 
United States would continue to adhere 
to the three-mile limit unless the con-
ference agreed on a change in the tradi-
tional rule. Dean made the following 
closing statement at the conference: 
We have made it clear from the 
beginning that in our view the 
3-mile rule is and will continue to 
be established international law, to 
which we adhere. It is the only 
breadth of the territorial sea on 
which there has ever been anything 
like common agreement. Unilateral 
acts of states claiming greater terri-
torial seas are not only not sanc-
tioned by any principle of interna-
tional law but are, indeed, in con-
flict with the universally accepted 
principle of freedom of the seas. 
Furthermore, we have made it 
clear that in our view there is no 
obligation on the part of states 
adhering to the 3-mile rule to 
recognize claims on the part of 
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other states to a greater hreadth 
of territorial sea. And on that we 
stand.' 
The United States has always heen one 
of the world's foremost advocates of the 
doctrine of the freedom of the seas and 
has vigorously opposed all efforts to 
restrict the free navigation of its war 
vessels and merchantmen. 
The concept of the freedom of the 
seas likewise applies to the freedom of 
the airspace ahove the seas.8 Because of 
this and other reasons, the United States 
Government, including the Navy De-
partment, has always advocated the 
three-mile limit of territorial waters 
delimited in such a way that the outer 
limits thereof closely follow the sinuosi-
ties of the coastline. Sovereign claims of 
waters of the high seas restrict the range 
of war vessels and merchantmen. By 
reducing sovereign claims to the narrow 
three-mile helt, the range of these ves-
sels is therehy expanded. The time-
honored position of the Navy is that the 
greater the freedom and range of its 
warships and aircraft, the hetter pro-
tected are the security interests of the 
United States hecause greater use can he 
made of warships and military aircraft.9 
Not only international prosperity hut 
also international well-heing has he en 
enhanced in suhstantial measure 
through preservation of the oceans as a 
common storehouse of riches. Equality 
of nations has had its fullest exemplifi-
cation in the fact that all states irre-
spective of relative wealth and ;ower 
position, have heen largely free to 
utilize the oceans. Solidarity and ex-
panding loyalties have heen furthered as 
the oceans have heen made to function 
not as ~arriers hetween peoples, such as 
mountams, hut as easily availahle links 
of communication and transportation 
fostering a cosmopolitan sense of iden-
tification hetween peoples of otherwise 
distant and foreign lands. 1 0 
Archipelago Concept. One of the 
more significant concepts of encroach-
ment on the areas of high seas is the 
unilateral attempt of such archipelagic 
nations as the Philippines and Indonesia 
to extend their territorial seas and in-
ternal waters in an exaggerated fashion 
and to the great detriment of other 
members of the international com-
munity. The Republic of the Philippines 
and the Republic of Indonesia hoth 
archipelago states, have claimed'sover-
eignty over all waters around, between, 
and connecting the different islands of 
the respective archipelagoes. Sealanes 
used throughout maritime history 
would be taken out of areas of the high 
seas by these unilateral actions. The 
claim of the Philippines was outlined in 
a note of the Philippine Foreign Office 
on 12 December 1955.11 The Indo-
nesian claim was contained in Act No.4 
of 18 February 1960.12 
The major claim sometimes made in 
connection with midocean archipelagoes 
is to delimit the territorial sea from a 
line connecting the outermost islands 
and to include all waters within the line 
as part of. internal waters. The primary 
counterclaim asserts that an island in an 
archipelago does not differ from any 
other island and that each should have 
only its own belt of territorial sea; in 
this view, there would be no question of 
straight baselines or of internal waters. 
In the archipelago concept an insular 
type baseline adapts the idea of a 
perimeter around an island or group of 
islands. (See Figures 1 and 2 for ex-
amples of midocean archipelagoes and 
coastal archipelagoes.)13 Such a line 
aro~nd an island would touch on capes, 
pemnsulas, offshore isles, or other 
prominent points along the coasts. Such 
a line around a group of islands or 
archipelago, would box in the ensem'ble 
the straight baseline normally touchin~ 
at the more prominent geographic 
features of the outermost islands. This 
type of straight baseline according to a 
State Department Geographic Bulletin is 
~o more justified t!tan a corresponding 
lme along the mamland. Again, each 
island has its own normal baseline and 
where islands are close together their 
territorial seas tend to coalesce. Other-
wisc the situation is that sufficient 
water distances exist between or among 
the islands to justify their status as high 
seas.14 
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of unilateral declaration of extension of 
the territorial seas by nation-states was 
made by the International Court of 
Justice in the Norwegian Fisheries Case: 
The delimitation of sea areas 
has always an international aspect; 
it cannot be dependent merely 
upon the will of the coastal State 
Unilateral Extension of Territorial as expressed in its municipal law. 
Seas Contrary to International Law. Although it is true that the act of 
Authoritative rejection of the concept delimitation is necessarily a 
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unilateral act, because only the 
coastal State is competent to 
undertake it, the validity of the 
delimitation with regard to other 
states depends upon international 
law.1S 
Nation-states claiming a competence to 
make unilateral determination of exten-
sions of territorial seas are attempting to 
determine not only their own interests 
but also the interests of other states. 
They invade the historic rights of other 
states by unilateral extension of their 
claims. The plea of sovereignty cannot 
of itself give a country any right to 
appropriate waters which are not, ac-
cording to law, its territorial waters any 
more than thct plea of sovereignty can 
give a country a right to land which is 
not already its territory. 
IT-HISTORIC CONCEPTS 
Internal Waters. Coastal states make 
their most comprehensive claims to au-
thority over certain immediately ad-
jacent waters, called "internal waters" 
or "inland waters." It is to be particu-
larly noted that Indonesia claims the 
waters within the Indonesian Archi-
pelago to be internal waters. It is gen-
erally an accepted principle of intern a-
tionallaw that rights of coastal states in 
internal waters are as complete and 
absolute in matters concerning these 
waters as they are in matters concerning 
their land areas. Internal or inland 
waters consist of a state's harbors, ports, 
roadsteads, internal gulfs and bays, 
straits, lakes, and rivers. In these waters, 
apart from special conventions, foreign 
states cannot, as a matter of strict law, 
demand any rights for their vessels or 
subjects. 
Authority in Internal Waters. Al-
though not physically equivalent to 
each other, for purposes of law internal 
waters are Jmt on the same level as land 
territory.l The exclusive claims which 
coastal states advance in this zone of 
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water are usually expressed in terms of 
sovereignty, independence, and jurisdic-
tion. Their opponents, although con-
ceding the comprehensive authority of 
the coastal state, propound another set 
of doctrines which purport to establish 
rules that derogate from the general 
principle; for example, with respect to 
entry, distress, and trade. Any accom-
,modation of both sets of claims cannot 
overlook the fact that the practice of 
extensive state control over such in-
ternal waters has become firmly estab-
lished now and is regarded as reason-
able. This is understandable if it is taken 
into consideration that control of such 
waters, which because of their close 
connection with the coast are regarded 
as land territory proper, is a necessity 
for the protection and development of 
the territory and interests of the coastal 
state and for the protection of, access 
to, and exit from the territorial base. 
The only reservation which is made to 
this all-comprising right over internal 
waters is that the exclusive demands of 
the coastal state should not be exercised 
in an arbitrary and unreasonable man-
ner.17 
The Indonesian Archipelago declara-
tion has been severely criticized for its 
transformation of extensive sea areas 
into internal waters. The unilateral 
declaration of the Indonesian Govern-
ment has met with the disapproval of 
most of the maritime nations which 
have, throughout history, used these 
important and much traveled straits and 
waters around Indonesia. The United 
States response to the Indonesian claim 
appears in The New York Times of 18 
January 1958.18 Protests of some of 
the other countries, such as the United 
Kingdom, The Netherlands, Japan, 
Australia, France, and New Zealand, are 
noted in Syatauw's book, Some Newly 
Established Asian States. 1 9 Under ac-
cepted practice in internal waters, the 
coastal state, in the absence of agree-
ment otherwise, controls all access of 
foreign vessels to internal waters what-
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ever the character of the vessel, even to 
the extreme of arhitrary exclusion.2 0 
The only exception would he on the 
ground of "necessity" due to stress of 
weather, and even here the coastal state 
generally asserts control over the vessel. 
Territorial Seas. No state or states-
man will deny the fact that there is a 
territorial sea and that it extends along 
all coastlines of all countries. Such a 
zone of offshore water can he regarded 
quite logically as that margin of the sea 
where a state may without interference 
carry on littoral functions essential to 
national welfare. No less than 99 sover-
eign states have coastlines hordering the 
sea. Unfortunately, offshore claims vary 
from state to state. 
Practically all coastal states charac-
terize their claim over the territorial sea 
as one of sovereignty. However, the 
authority over the territorial sea is 
somewhat less comprehensive than that 
over internal waters in that there is a 
right to be free of interference in the 
passage of ships through the territorial 
sea, referred to as right of innocent 
passage. This right is particularly urged 
when the territorial sea includes a strait 
necessarily or conveniently used for 
navigation hetween waters outside the 
territorial helt.2 1 
Indonesia declared on 13 Decemher 
1957 that all waters surrounding, he-
tween, and connecting the islands con-
stituting the Indonesian State, regardless 
of their extension or hreadth, are in-
tegral parts of the territory of the 
Indonesian State. The above statement 
was confirmed on 18 Fehruary 1960 in 
Act No. 4. 
This Indonesian declaration asserting 
an archipelago concept of measurement 
of seas unilaterally attempts estahlish-
ment of a regime in its waters which 
allows for little distinction hetween 
internal waters and territorial seas. Indo-
nesian waters have heen proclaimed 
internal waters. The exclusive sover-
eignty has been tempered slightly hy a 
statement which expressly accorded the 
right of innocent passage to foreign 
ships unless their hehavior is detrimental 
to the security of the state. Since the 
right of innocent passage of warships is 
not completely settled in international 
law, the Indonesian declaration is of 
serious consequences to maritime 
nations.22 Innocent passage is discussed 
in detail later in this chapter. 
Thus, the authority which the Gov-
ernment of Indonesia has conferred 
upon itself is a far-reaching one. It 
would apparently imply that all internal 
waters, i.e., all waters between the 
islands of the archipelago, could he 
closed to foreign warships at any time 
and to merchant vessels if they are 
considered to endanger the security of 
the state. Syatauw states that this pro-
vision has understandahly aroused much 
protest from other seafaring nations, 
hut here, as it is so often the case, it is 
not the letter but the spirit of the 
regulation which is of importance. If the 
above stipulation is intended by the 
Indonesian Government to mean that it 
can close its internal waters to foreign 
men-of-war or even merchant vessels 
arhitrarily, then such an act would 
ignore the legitimate claims of other 
interested parties and disregard com-
munity practices which have heen 
arrived at after a centuries-old process 
of halancing of claims and counter-
claims. It has been suggested hy writers 
such as McDougal and Bouchez that the 
particular configuration of Indonesia as 
an archipelago with innumerable islands, 
extensive waters, and enormous coast 
length might very well justify a quicker 
use of its sovereign authority to prevent 
any passage of a foreign ship than is 
allowed to countries with a solid land 
hase.23 
The test of legality with respect to 
Indonesia's exclusive claims cannot lie 
in the apparent meaning of a few 
prescriptions hut in the question of 
whether her activities can stand the test 
of reasonableness. The result can he 
arrived at only after a fair balancing of 
all relevant factors.2 4 
Right of Innocent Passage. The Inter-
national Law Commission in its 1956 
draft took up the question of whether 
in waters which became internal waters 
when thc straight baseline system is 
applied, the right of passage should not 
be granted in the same way as in the 
territorial sea. The Commission recog-
nized that if a state wished to make a 
fresh delimitation of its territorial sea 
according to the straight baseline prin-
ciple, thus including in its internal 
waters parts of the high seas or the 
territorial sea that had previously been 
waters through which international 
traffic passed, other nations could not 
be deprived of the right of passage in 
those waters. Article 5, paragraph 2, of 
the Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and the Contiguous Zone, adopted at 
the Geneva Conference on the Law of 
the Sea in 1958, provides: 
Where the establishment of a 
straight baseline in accordance 
with article 4 has the effect of 
enclosing as internal waters areas 
which previously had been con-
sidered as part of the territorial 
sea or of the high seas, a right of 
innocent passage, as provided in 
article 14 to 23, shall exist in 
those waters.25 
Should the nations of the world 
acknowledge the claim of Indonesia to 
the archipelago waters, Indonesia has 
indicated by her actions that she would 
not follow the above provision except 
perhaps on terms strictly of her making 
and with no assurance of the right of 
innocent passage guaranteed to all. 
Specific incidents of Indonesian actions 
contrary to the above article are stated 
in detail on page 345. The Explanatory 
memorandum issued by Indonesia, 
quoted on page 347, states that "Indo-
nesia may withdraw . the facilities 
granted." It seems that a so-called grant 
of innocent passage by Indonesia in 
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internal waters is to stimulate com-
mercial shipping and that the "conces-
sions" are a matter of grace on the part 
of Indonesia and not a matter of right 
for any nation.2 6 
Correspondence from the Office of 
the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of 
State, had the following comment on 
the enjoyment of what is known as the 
right of innocent passage: 
While [the territorial sovereign ] 
may regulate at will matters per-
taining to fisheries, the enjoyment 
of the underlying land, coastal 
trade, police and pilotage [as well 
as] the use of particular channels, 
it is not permitted to debar for-
eign merchant vessels from the 
enjoyment of what is known as 
the right of innocent passage, so 
long as the conduct of a vessel is 
not injurious to the safe~ and 
welfare of the littoral State. 7 
According to Jessup: 
The right of innocent passage 
seems to be the result of an 
attempt to reconcile the freedom 
of ocean navigation with the 
theory of territorial waters. While 
recogmzmg the necessity of 
granting to littoral states a zone of 
water along the coast, the family 
of nations was unwilling to 
prejudice the newly gained 
freedom of the seas. As a general 
principle, the right of innocent 
passage requires no supporting 
argument or citation of authority; 
it is firmly established in intern a-
tionallaw.28 
The Convention on the Territorial 
Sea and the Contiguous Zone, con-
cluded in 1958 at the Conference on the 
Law of the Sea, included the following 
provisions on the right of innocent 
passage as article 14: 
1. Subject to the provisions of 
these articles, ships of all States, 
whether coastal or not, shall enjoy 
the right of innocent passage 
through the territorial sea. 
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2. Passage means navigation 
through the territorial eea for the 
purpose either of traversing that 
sea without entering internal 
waters, or of proceeding to in-
ternal waters, or of making for the 
high seas from internal waters. 
3. Passage includes stopping and 
anchoring, hut only insofar as the 
same are incidental to ordinary 
navigation or are rendered neces-
sary hy force majeure or hy dis-
tress. 
4. Passage is innocent so long as it 
is not prejudicial to the peace, 
good order or security of the 
coastal State. Such passage shall 
take place in conformity with 
these articles and with other rules 
of international law. 
5. Passage of foreign fishing ves-
sels shall not he considered inno-
cent if they do not ohserve such 
laws and regulations as the coastal 
State may make and puhlish in 
order to prevent these vessels 
from fishing in the territorial sea. 
6. Suhmarines are required to 
navigate on the surface and to 
show their flag.2 9 
In defining what is "innocent pas-
sage," the Convention article 14, para-
graph 4, departed from the text of the 
International Law Commission draft 
which provided that "passage is inno-
cent so long as the ship does not use the 
territorial sea for committing any acts 
prejudicial to the security of the coastal 
State .... ,,3 0 In lieu thereof the Con-
ference adopted in the Convention on 
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone the following definition: "Passage 
is innocent so long as it is not preju-
dicial to the peace, good order or 
security of the coastal state. " 
In placing emphasis on passage, as 
such, and not on the acts committed 
during passage, the provision has hroad-
ened the rights of the coastal state and 
would seem to allow it to interfere with 
passage on such grounds as nature of the 
cargo or its ultimate destination.31 
Eighteen states suhmitted comments 
on the International Law Commission 
draft of 1956 on the right of innocent 
passage. Twenty-five states commented 
on the 1955 draft. Of these, no state 
denied the right of innocent passage for 
ships other than warships as a general 
principle of international law. 
The qualifications on the right of 
innocent passage flow from the hasic 
proposition that "the sovereignty of a 
State extends ... to a helt of sea ad-
jacent to its coast, descrihed as the 
territorial sea. "32 Ships exercising the 
right of innocent passage have never 
heen deemed to enjoy more than a 
"qualified immunity" from the shore 
state's jurisdiction, to horrow a phrase 
from J essup~ 
Sir Maurice Gwyer, a delegate of 
Great Britain at the Conference for the 
Progressive Codification of International 
Law held at The Hague in 1930, after 
giving recognition to "the right of for-
eign ships to navigate the territorial 
waters of the coastal state in the exer-
cise of the right of innocent passage," 
added: 
... it is not to he assumed for one 
moment that a ship which is 
exercising the right of innocent 
passage is outside the sovereignty 
or jurisdiction of the coastal State 
for all purposes. No coastal State 
could admit such a proposal and 
no maritime States whose ships 
are navigating the waters of a 
coastal State would endeavour to 
assert such a proposal. 33 
Corfu Channel Case. The right of 
innocent passage was liherally construed 
hy the International Court of J usticc in 
the Corfu Channel case (United King-
dom v. Alhania).34 Following the end 
of the Second World War, British vessels 
cleared the Straits of Corfu of mines 
between the Greek island of Corfu and 
the mainland shore of Greece and 
Albania. Shortly thereafter, two British 
destroyers struck mines while traversing 
the Straits. Great Britain then sent 
minesweepers into the Straits, in accord-
ance with a decision of the International 
Mine Sweeping Commission, and this 
action was protested by Albania on the 
grounds of invasion of Albanian terri-
torial sovereignty. It was the opinion of 
the Court that the Government of the 
United Kingdom was not bound to 
abstain from exercising its right of 
passage, which the Albanian Govern-
ment had illegally denied. Further, the 
Court did not characterize those mea-
sures taken by the United Kingdom 
authorities as a violation of Albania's 
sovereignty. 
The right of innocent passage for 
warships was explicitly upheld by the 
Court in the following language: 
It is, in the opinion of the Court, 
generally recognized and in ac-
cordance with international cus-
tom that States in time of peace 
have a right to send their warships 
through straits used for interna-
tional navigation between two 
parts of the high seas without the 
previous authorization of a coastal 
State, provided that the passage is 
innocent. Unless otherwise pre-
scribed in an international conven-
tion, there is no right for a coastal 
State to prohibit such passa:f:e 
through straits in time of peace. 5 
McDougal points out that it was clearly 
assumed as a basis of this decision that 
the character of a vessel does not 
necessarily determine whether passage 
through straits is innocent. The Court 
assimilated warships to merchant ships 
with respect to protection of a right of 
access to this part of the marginal 
belt. 36 
The right asserted in this case was 
directly connected with the use of the 
territorial sea although it involved 
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passage through a strait- The principles 
contained in this case may be highly 
significant should Indonesia try to close 
the many straits to warships on the basis 
of their transit not being innocent 
merely because of their status as war-
ships. 
There is no longer any significant 
dispute as to the "right of innocent 
passage (subject to regulations of the 
coastal state) for merchant ships in the 
territorial sea, at least in the absence of 
a state of hostilities. However, there is 
some difference of opinion between 
nations as to the right of innocent 
passage of warships in these areas. Some 
countries contend that prior authoriza-
tion is necessary from the coastal state; 
some contend that there should be prior 
notification from the warship to the 
coastal state; and some contend that 
none of these clearance procedures is 
necessary for passage. The 1958 Con-
vention does not provide for either prior 
authorization or prior notification in 
the case of warships but does provide in 
article 14(6) that "submarines are re-
quired to navigate on the surface and to 
show their flag" when passing through 
territorial waters. The state of the law 
has been disputed by the Soviets, but all 
proposals at the first Conference which 
required either prior notification or 
authorization for passage of warships 
through the territorial sea were rejected, 
thus showing the intent not to include 
such provisions or limitations. 3 7 
Although the Convention as it now 
stands contains no special provision 
relating to the innocent passage of 
warships, and the text would warrant 
the conclusion that warships have the 
same rights in this respect as other ships, 
one cannot ignore the proceedings of 
the Conference. Particularly trouble-
some is the reservation made by Russia 
and other bloc countries reserving the 
right "to establish procedures for the 
authorization of the passage of foreign 
warships" through its territorial waters. 
There may be serious questions on this 
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point in the future, and any extension 
of territorial seas by Indonesia and the 
Philippines in those critical areas of the 
world may have dire effects on maritime 
traffic through those waters. 
The above discussion related to inno-
cent passage through territorial seas. As 
has been previously pointed out as a 
general rule, there is no right of inno-
cent passage for any ship, merchant or 
warship, in internal waters under rules 
of international law. Should the claimed 
waters be determined internal waters 
instead of territorial seas, the legal 
restrictions under present concepts of 
international law would be even more 
severe. As has been pointed out Indo-
nesia has indicated she would permit 
passage of vessels if their passage was 
not detrimental to the State. Such 
action would be a matter of grace and 
not a matter of right This is a far cry 
from the centuries-old practice of pas-
sage through these strategic waters 
under the principles of high seas. 
U.S. Congressional Committee 
Studies Innocent Passage. The question 
of innocent passage is a two-edged 
sword. Maritime nations look for as few 
restrictions for their ships as possible. 
Nations with long coastlines generally 
give some thought to adding restrictions 
to shipping and holding to the rights of 
the coastal state. In this connection 
extracts from hearings before a commit-
tee of our own Congress is in point. The 
House Committee on Armed Services 
conducted hearings on 9 and 10 July 
1963 on the subject of Russian trawler 
traffic in U.S. territorial waters. The 
Committee report contained the follow-
ing pertinent comments: 
The Navy- view on the presump-
tion of innocence with respect to 
the passage of trawlers close to 
the U.S. shores was presented by 
Admiral Reed. It is a question, he 
said, of interpretation of what is 
preju dicial to security. Lacking 
evidence of any overt act which 
could be considered a potential 
hazard to security-such as 
stopping, anchoring, or behaving 
in a suspicious manner-and in the 
light of a general pattern of ordi-
nary navigation, he indicated that 
it is to the mutual interest of all 
nations that the right of innocent 
passage not be denied under 
circumstances such as those dealt 
with in this report. 
It would seem that a more dis-
criminating application of the 
doctrine of innocent passage to 
foreign shipping is in order. To 
the subcommittee there seems to 
be a distinction between a pri-
vately owned ship designed and 
operated for normal commereial 
or peaceful purposes and a Gov-
ernment-owned vessel which is 
equipped or operated in a manner 
as to cause a reasonable person to 
question the normalcy or peace-
fulness of its presence along our 
shores.38 
Airspace. It is important to note that 
the right of innocent passage applies to 
ships and not to aircraft. Aircraft do not 
enjoy this right and may enter the 
airspace above the territorial sea only 
with the consent of the coastal state. 
Only above the high seas is there an 
absence of any restriction pertaining to 
sovereign rights. The complicated struc-
ture of international airways with their 
technical requirements must in all cases 
conform to the sovereign pattern of 
land and the marginal seas. Planes of 
one state may fly over the territorial sea 
of another state only by bilateral or 
mul tilateral agreements, and such 
accord is by no means always assured in 
the present-day world. Flight of military 
aircraft must adhere strictly to practices 
incorporated in the Law of the Sea 
Conventions.39 The Soviet denial of 
freedom of flight to either commercial 
or private civil aircraft by treaty or 
otherwise is emphasized by Soviet 
attempts to deny freedom of flight even 
over the high seas by repeated aggressive 
attacks upon forcign aircraft. An ex-
ample of utter disregard for interna-
tional law is shown in the Soviet attack 
on 1 July 1960 on a U.S. RB-47 
reconnaissance aircraft over interna-
tional waters. The Soviets attempted to 
force the plane off course into Soviet 
territory. They failed in this but did 
shoot the plane down over the high 
seas.40 Thcre have been dozens of such 
attacks over the years. 41 
III-ARCHIPELAGO CONCEPT 
Arehipelago Defined. Archipelago is 
a Greek word that means "chief sea." 
The term now applies to any broad 
expanse of water that contains a num-
ber of islands, and often it is used for 
the islands themselves. The term "archi-
pelago" may be defined as follows: "An 
archipelago is a formation of two or 
more islands (islets or rocks) which 
geographically may be considered as a 
whole. ,,42 In some archipelagoes the 
islands and islets are clustered together 
in a compact group, while others are 
spread out over great areas of water. 
Sometimes they consist of a string of 
islands, islets, and rocks forming a fence 
or rampart for the mainland against the 
ocean. In other cases, they protrude 
from the mainland out into the sea like 
a peninsula or a cape, like the Cuban 
Cays or the Keys of Florida. 
Geographically these many variations 
may be termed archipelagoes. For this 
thesis two basic types of archipelagoes 
will be discussed: Coastal archipelagoes 
and outlying (or midocean) archipel-
agoes. 
Coastal archipelagoes are those situ-
ated so close to a mainland that they 
may reasonably be considered part and 
parcel thereof, forming more or less an 
ou ter coastline from which it is natural 
to measure the territorial seas. A typical 
example is the coastline of Norway 
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forming a marked outer coastline. Fin-
land, Greenland, Iceland, Sweden, and 
Yugoslavia, as well as certain stretches 
of the coasts of Alaska and Canada, are 
other areas with coastal archipelagoes. 
Outlying (midocean) archipelagoes 
are groups of islands situated in the 
ocean at such a distance from the coasts 
of firm land as to be considered an 
independent whole rather than forming 
part of an outer coastline of the main-
land. The Faeroes, Fiji Island, Gala-
pagos, Hawaiian Islands, Indonesia, 
Japan, the Philippines, the Solomon 
Islands, and the Svalbard Archipelago 
are examples. 
There are several basic principles of 
international law which must be con-
stantly borne in mind in answering 
questions as to what rules of interna-
tionallaw govern the concrete delimita-
tion of the territorial waters of an 
archipelago. Some of these basic rules 
concern the straight baseline system 
governing heavily indented coastlines, 
the waters of isolated islands, the prin-
ciple of the freedom of the seas, and 
rules governing bays and fjords. 
The attempts to discover or reach a 
consensus respecting delimitation of the 
territorial sea in midocean archipelagoes 
began after the First World War. Of the 
scientific association, only the Institute 
de Droit International and the American 
Institute of International Law thought 
that the islands ought to be treated as a 
unit. The International Law Association 
included nothing on this problem in its 
1926 Draft Convention. The 1929 Har-
vard Research in International Law sug-
gested in its draft convention On terri-
torial waters that each island should 
have its own territorial sea and that this 
was adequate also for archipelagoes.43 
The preparatory work for the 1930 
conference indicated possible agreement 
along the lines of treating certain island 
groups as a whole, but the conference 
did not succeed in reaching any firm 
agreement. The Law of the Sea Conven-
tions of 1958 and 1960 left the problem 
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for further study just as was done by 
the 1930 Convention. The following 
discussion covers opinions of writers on 
international law on the subject, the 
lack of codification by the various 
conventions, and finally a study of the 
U.S. position on this question. 
Concept of Writers on International 
Law. Outlying midocean archipelagoes, 
including Indonesia and the Philippines, 
were distinguished from coastal archi-
pelagoes in the preparatory study for 
the 1958 Conference on the Law of the 
Sea by Evensen of Norway who dis-
cussed "Certain Legal Aspects Concern-
ing the Delimitation of the Territorial 
Waters of Archipelagoes." 
Where authors on international law 
have considered the problems of archi-
pelagoes they tend to look upon such 
formations generally as units. This con-
cept therefore entails the legal implica-
tions on the delimitation of territorial 
waters of the archipelagoes .. A few of 
the more noted writers have commented 
as follows. 
Philip C. Jessup adopted the follow-
ing rules: "In the case of archipelagoes 
the constituent islands are considered as 
forming a unit, and the extent of 
territorial waters is measured from the 
islands farthest from the center of the 
archipelagoes. ,:44 No maximum is 
proposed by Jessup as to the distance 
between the islands and islets of such 
archipelagoes. 
Hyde seems to advocate the view 
that archipelagoes may juridically be 
considered a unit. He states: 
Where, however, a group of 
islands forms a fringe or cluster 
around the ocean front of a mari-
time State it may be doubted 
whether there is evidence of any 
rule of international law that 
obliges such State invariably to 
limit or measure its claim to 
waters around them by the exact 
distance which separate the 
several units.45 
Colombos writes as follows: 
The generally recognized rule 
appears to be that a group of 
islands forming part of an archi-
pelago shall be considered as a 
unit and the extent of territorial 
waters measured from the centre 
of the archipelago. In the case of 
isolated or widely scattered 
groups of islands, not constituting 
an archipelago, the better view 
seems to be that each island will 
have its own territorial waters, 
thus excluding a single belt for the 
whole group. Whether a group of 
islands forms or not an archi-
pelago is determined by geo-
graphical conditions, but it also 
depends, in some cases, on his-
torical or prescriptive grounds.46 
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, the British 
jurist, who served on the International 
Court of Justice, has written: 
The facts are that in the begin-
ning, States applied the ordinary 
rule of a territorial belt around all 
the individual islands of a group, 
separately. If the islands were 
close enough, these waters ipso 
facto overlapped and made a 
zone. If not, there was a gap of 
high seas between them. No sug-
gestion was made for treating 
groups as a unit for territorial 
waters purposes, with a belt of 
territorial sea round the unit as a 
whole, based on lines joining the 
individual islands, and with an 
interior zone of national waters 
within the islands and the base-
lines. At the next stage (i.e., about 
the period of the 1930 Confer-
ence), there was a movement in 
favour of baselines joining islands 
in a group, if sufficiently close, 
but many States still did not 
subscribe to the idea, while those 
that favoured it did so only on the 
basis that there was to be definite 
limit of twice the breadth of 
territorial waters, or of ten or 
twelve miles, for such lines. Also, 
the waters inside the lines were to 
be territorial, not internal. How-
ever, nothing came of this at the 
1930 Conference, and subsequent 
State practice was hardly altered 
at all in the direction even of 
drawing any lines between the 
islands of a group.47 
Waldoek, writing about the 1930 
Conference, had the following to say 
concerning the reluctance of nations to 
take a position on the archipelago prob-
lem. 
Unquestionably, there was a 
marked tendency in 1930 to fa-
vour the introduction of a special 
rule for archipelagoes, whether 
coastal or ocean, but subject to a 
limit of width between the islands 
and with a strong reservation by 
some states against the waters 
being treated as inland waters. 
Gidel, who was a member of 
Sub-Committee No. IT, afterwards 
expressed the view that until a 
new rule was framed the general 
law of territorial waters ap-
plied.48 
Codification by Conferences Not 
Conclusive on Archipelagoes. Arthur 
Dean points out in his artiele in the 
American Journal of International Law 
that The Hague Conference study in 
1930 suggested as a possible compro-
mise that all waters in the archipelago 
should be territorial waters. The study 
concluded that in the case of midocean 
archipelagoes "exorbitantly long base-
lines, elosing vast areas of the sea to free 
navigation and fishing, are contrary to 
international law." He further states 
that the study also concluded that 
whether the waters within the archi-
pelago can be considered as internal 
waters depends upon "whether such 
water areas are so closely linked to the 
surrounding land domain of the archi-
pclago as to be treated in much the 
same manner as the surrounding 
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land. '>49 This apparently refers to 
coastal archipelagoes and would be in 
keeping with the reasoning in the Nor-
wegian Fisheries Case of some 20 years 
later which directly related to the 
coastal islands or archipelagoes off Nor-
way. The Hague Conference left for 
further study the general status of archi-
pelagoes in international law. 
It is to be specifically noted that 
article 4 of the Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zones of 
1958 limits the enclosing of waters 
between islands as internal waters to the 
situation of the coastal archipelagoes.5 0 
The new concept of historic title to a 
maritime area was presented at the 
second law of the sea conference by 
both the Philippine and Indonesian dele-
gates. They elaimed that their archi-
pelagoes were historical units enclosing 
the claimed sea areas on the basis of 
historic as well as geographical right. 
They admitted, however, that their 
archipelago theory had not yet found 
general recognition in international 
law. 51 The Philippine delegate stated 
that the Philippines had been considered 
"from time immemorial" as a "single 
territorial unit," citing the Treaty of 
Paris of 1898 as an instance. The Indo-
nesian Statute of 1960 similarly states 
that "since time immemorial the Indo-
nesian Archipelago has constituted one 
entity." This philosophy met with little 
success at the conference. 
The wide variety of rules and of state 
practice prevented the International 
Law Commission of 1955 from drafting 
specific articles concerning the extent 
and delimitation of the territorial waters 
of archipelagoes. As far as coastal archi-
pelagoes are concerned, article 5 of the 
draft endeavored to embody the princi-
ples laid down by the International 
Court of Justice in its 1951 judgment in 
the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case. 
Where outlying (midocean) archi-
pelagoes are concerned, the draft ar-
ticles of the International Law Commis-
sion do not give any specific guidance as 
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to the governing principles of interna-
tionallaw.52 
The text evolved by the International 
Law Commission with respect to islands, 
and cqntained in its 1956 and final 
report, together with its commentary 
thereon, read: "Article 10. Every island 
has its own territorial sea. An island is an 
area of land, surrounded by water, which 
in normal circumstances is permanently 
above high-water mark. " 
The more significant and pertinent 
statement contained in the commentary 
to the above article relating to archipel-
agoes reads as follows: 
(3) The Commission had in-
tended to follow-up this article 
wi th a provIsion concerning 
groups of islands. Like The Hague 
Conference of International Law 
of 1930, the Commission was 
unable to overcome the difficul-
ties involved. The problem is 
singularly complicated by the dif-
ferent forms it takes in different 
archipelagoes. The Commission 
was prevented from stating an 
opinion, not only by disagreement 
on the breadth of the territorial 
sea, but also by lack of technical 
information on the subject. It 
recognizes the importance of this 
question and hopes that if an 
international conference subse-
quently studies the proposed rules 
it will give attention to it.5 3 
Thus, both the 1930 and the 
1958-60 Conference failed to consider 
any attempt toward codification of 
principles on the treatment of archipel-
agoes. It is the opinion of the writer 
that if and when there is another law of 
the sea conference, the question of 
archipelagoes will be of top priority for 
consideration since their status not only 
is of importance to the owner nation 
but is of deep importance to every 
maritime nation. 
U.S. Position on Delimitation of 
Archipelagoes. It is the traditional 
position of the United States that its 
territorial sea is three nautical miles in 
breadth measured from low-water mark 
on its coasts. An island has its own 
territorial sea measured from the same 
baseline. As an example, it is the U.S. 
position that each of the islands of the 
Hawaiian Archipelago has its own terri-
torial sea, three miles in breadth mea-
sured from low-water mark on the coast 
of the island. The waters seaward of 
these belts of territorial sea are high seas 
over which no State exercises sover-
eignty.54 
The same position has been taken in 
connection with the Pacific Trust Terri-
tory Islands: The Marshalls, the 
Carolines, and Marianas. These unitary 
administered islands each have a band 
three miles wide around each individual 
island. Thus, the treatment of the 
islands and groups of islands, with 
respect to territorial waters, is approxi-
mately the same as the treatment of 
larger land masses such as continents. 
G. Etzel Pearcy, Geographer, Depart-
ment of State, has written: 
Islands have their own territorial 
seas, which mayor may not 
coalesce with the territorial sea of 
the mainland. Islands within 6 
miles of each other have territorial 
seas which of necessity overlap 
and in steppingstone fashion may 
extend the sovereignty of the 
state over distances far beyond 
the mainland coast. This situation 
is true off the coast of Massa-
chusetts, where the territorial sea 
of Martha's Vineyard coalesces 
with that of the mainland as well 
as with that of Nantucket Island. 
As a result territorial waters ex-
tend some 30 miles seaward from 
the Massachusetts coast opposite 
Martha's Vineyard. 
In contrast, the channel islands, 
off the coast of southern Cali-
fornia (Catalina, San Clemente, 
Santa Rosa), are too distant from 
the coast for their territorial seas 
to merge with that of the main-
land. Likewise, Block Island, off 
the coast of Rhode Island, is more 
than 6 miles from the nearest land 
along the New England coast. 55 
Case of Civil Aeronautics Board v. 
Island Airlines, Inc. The United States 
has followed the concept that every 
island of an archipelago has its own 
territorial sea and the waters (which do 
not overlap) interlacing the archipelago 
are high seas. This principle was thor-
oughly discussed in the 9th United 
States Circuit Court in 1964 in the case 
of Civil Aeronautics Board v. Island 
Airlines, Inc.5 6 Additionally, this case 
considered in detail the principles in-
volved in reference to historical waters. 
The latter principle was one of the bases 
of the Philippine claim to internal 
waters within the Archipelago of the 
Philippines. The United States judicial 
decision on both points will be ex-
amined here. 
In the Spring of 1963, Islant! Air-
lines, Inc. (Island), commenced opera-
tions between several of the major 
islands of the State of Hawaii (State)' 
under the authority of the Public Utili-
ties Commission of the State of Hawaii 
(PUC), but without attempting first to 
obtain from the Civil Aeronautics Board 
(CAB) a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity as required. 
Shortly thereafter, on 24 May 1963, the 
CAB began an action against Island in 
the U.S. District Court for Hawaii, 
claiming that Island was an air carrier 
engaged in interstate air transportation. 
The CAB sought a declaratory judgment 
as to its exclusive jurisdiction and an 
injunction against operations by Island 
until it obtained from the CAB the 
certificate of public convenience and 
necessity called for by the Civil Aero-
nautics Act. Island answered that its 
flights between the major islands of 
Hawaii were intrastate flights. 
The major islands making up the 
State of Hawaii are separated from each 
other bv the waters of the North Pacific 
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Ocean, and the distances between the 
islands of Kauai and Oahu, Oahu and 
Molokai, Molokai and Maui, and Maui 
and Hawaii. The channels in between 
these islands vary from 7.5 to 62.9 
nautical miles. 
The Court expressed the view that air 
transportation over the high seas outside 
of the territorial limits of a state consti-
tutes air transportation over a "place" 
outside of that state. It referred to the 
Geneva Convention on the High Seas of 
1958, the U.S. precedents, and the 
legislative history of the Civil Aero-
nautics Act. 
Island urged that the channels be-
tween the islands of the State of Hawaii 
are within the boundaries of the State 
and therefore that flights between the 
islands are flights over the territorial 
waters of Hawaii and not through the 
airspace over any place outside of the 
State. Island argued that straight base-
lines should run completely around the 
eastern perimeter of the Hawaiian 
Archipelao from island headland to 
island headland and on the western 
perimeter should run straight from 
Niihau's Kawaihoa Point to Hawaii's Ka 
Lae, thus including within its bound-
aries all of the open ocean between "the 
cord of the bow and the bow itself;" 
however, not even Kamehameha II ever 
made any such grandiose claim. 
At least three factors must be taken 
in to consideration in determining 
whether a state has acquired a historic 
title to a maritime area. These factors 
are: (1) the exercise of authority over 
the area by the state claIming the 
historic right; (2) a continuity of this 
exercise of authority; and (3) the atti-
tude of foreign states. The authority 
which a state must continuously exer-
cise over a maritime area in order to be 
able to claim it validly as historic waters 
is sovereignty. This means it must be 
claimed as a part of its national domain. 
In the absence of international approval 
of the claim, the activities carried on by 
the state in the area in question must be 
something far more objective than 
simply unilateral claims by local legisla-
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tion. The sovereignty claimed must be 
effectively exercised. The intent of the 
state must be expressed by deed and not 
merely by proclamations. Also, the acts 
must have notoriety which is normal for 
acts of the state. 
The burden of proving the open and 
notorious use of the area in question, 
said the Court, rests on the state's 
claiming that its historical waters 
possess a character inconsistent with the 
principle of the freedom of the high 
seas. 
The United States never maintained 
either locally, nationally, or interna-
tionally that the channel waters were 
being claimed by the United States as 
historical waters, and thus internal 
waters of Hawaii. 
Consistent with its international 
policy of freedom of the seas and a 
narrow territorial water, the various 
departments of the Government, in all 
hearings before Congress, insisted that 
the channel waters, beyond .the three-
mile limit, were high seas. 
The Court concluded that "the 
boundaries of Hawaii were fixed at 
three nautical miles from the line of 
ordinary low water surrounding each 
and every one of the islands composing 
the State of Hawaii. " In any event, the 
flight patterns for interisland travel were 
such that aircraft would have to fly over 
the high seas well beyond any area 
which might be claimed by Hawaii to be 
part of its territorial sea. 
It was therefore the opinion of the 
Court that, whether Island flies over the 
channels or outside them, it is com-
pelled to fly its passengers over places 
outside the State's boundaries in order 
to fulfill its obligations as an air carrier 
between the islands of Hawaii. 
IV-UNILATERAL DECLARATIONS 
OF SERIOUS IMPORTANCE 
Indonesia. The Philippines and Indo-
nesia have each unilaterally adopted the 
so-called archipelago theory by which 
they would draw a perimeter around 
their outermost island, to the east, west, 
north, and south. Then they claim all 
the waters lying within that perimeter as 
historic internal waters. These claims 
have not been recognized by the United 
States. Through such internal waters 
there would be no right of innocent 
passage except subject to unilateral con-
trol, no right of submerged navigation, 
and no right of aircraft overflight in the 
absence of express treaty provisions. 
Extending outward from these archipel-
ago perimeters, these two countries 
would also have a belt of territorial seas, 
which Indonesia claims out to 12 miles 
and the Philippines claim at varying 
limits allegedly established by the 1898 
and 1900 treaties between the United 
States and Spain ceding the Philip-
pines.57 
The great extent of such claims can 
be appreciated only by realizing that 
Indonesia extends over 3,000 miles cast 
and west and over 1,300 miles north 
and south. Likewise, the Philippines, 
which consists of over 7,000 islands, 
extends roughly 600 miles cast and west 
and 1,000 miles north and south. Many 
sealanes lie within these self-proclaimed 
internal waters. 
Advocates of the archipelago theory 
claim that ships on peaceful missions 
can navigate the elaimed internal waters, 
but the transitory nature of such rights 
is well exemplified by recent Indonesian 
regulations, effective as of August 1960, 
which forbid Dutch vessels to pick up or 
discharge passengers or cargo in Indo-
nesian waters.58 Thus, even though 
Dutch ships may sail upon the surface 
of these seas, they can have no hope of 
commercial operations. 
One glance at the map of the Indo-
nesian Archipelago is sufficient to prove 
the important place which the sea occu-
pies in this area. The archipelago is 
comprised of five main islands of 
Sumatra, Java, Borneo, Celebes, and 
New Guinea, surrounded by a host of 
smaller islands. This is an area of more 
than three million square miles with 
only about 700,000 square miles com-
prising land. 
The strategic importance of Indo-
nesia lies in its position as a bridge 
between the Asian and Australian conti-
nents and the fact that it is surrounded 
by most of the important waters of 
Asia. In the east it is bordered by the 
Pacific, in the west by the Indian Ocean. 
In the north it is separated from the 
Asian mainland by the Strait of Malacca 
and the South China Sea, and from the 
Philippines by the Sulu Sea, while in the 
south the Indian Ocean and the Arafura 
Sea separate it from Australia. The 
commercial and maritime importance of 
this area is enhanced by the many lines 
of world communication which pass 
through these waters, most of them 
being concentrated on a few important 
straits, such as Sunda Strait, Strait of 
Macassa, and Torres Strait. 
On 14 December 1957, the Govern-
ment of Indonesia, following a meeting 
of the Council of Ministers which took 
place on 13 December 1957, issued an 
"Announcement on the Territorial 
Waters of the Republic of Indonesia." It 
was stated, inter alia, in the announce-
ment that: 
Historically, the Indonesian 
Archipelago has been an entity 
since time immemorial. 
In view of territorial entirety 
and of preserving the wealth of 
the Indonesian state, it is deemed 
necessary to consider all waters 
between the islands an entire en-
tity. 
On the ground of the above 
considerations, the Government 
states that all waters around, be-
tween and connecting, the islands 
or parts of islands belonging to 
the Indonesian archipelago irre-
spective of their width or dimen-
sion are natural appurtenances of 
its land territory and therefore an 
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integral part of the inland or 
national waters subject to the 
absolute sovereignty of Indonesia. 
The peaceful passage of foreign 
vessels through these waters is 
guaranteed as long and insofar as 
it is not contrary to the sover-
eignty of the Indonesian State or 
harmful to her security. 
The delimitation of the terri-
torial sea, with a width of 12 
nautical miles, shall be measured 
from straight baselines connecting 
the outermost points of the 
islands of the Republic of Indo-
nesia.59 
The outstanding features of this 
declaration can be summarized as fol-
lows: 
(I) Indonesia is an archipelago and 
must therefore be treated as one unit. 
(2) All waters surrounding, hetween, 
and connecting the islands of the archi-
pelago, regardless of breadth, are to he 
considered as internal waters. 
(3) The breadth of Indonesian terri-
torial sea is 12 miles, to he measured 
from baselines connecting outermost 
points of the islands at the fringe of the 
archipelago. 
(4) Innocent passage is guaranteed as 
long as it neither prejudices nor violates 
the sovereignty and security of Indo-
nesia-as determined hy Indonesia. 
As could he expected, the declara-
tion evoked much comment from other 
memhers of the community of states. 
Their reaction can he divided into three 
categories. First, there was the group of 
states which strongly criticized the 
Indonesian actions as heing contrary to 
the rules of international law. They 
were Australia, France, the United King-
dom, Japan, New Zealand, the United 
States, and The Netherlands. These 
ohjections came principally from the hig 
maritime nations whose interests were 
directly affected hy the restrictions im-
posed hy the Indonesian decree. The 
great majority of states did not react in 
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any way. Russia unequivocally came out 
in favor of the Indonesian claims, which 
was considered by Russia to be fully in 
accord with the rules of international 
law.60 
Indonesia has proceeded to imple-
ment the government declaration of 
1957 by legislation of 18 February 
1960 identified as Act No.4. This 
legislation provides in part as follows: 
Article 1 
(1) The Indonesian waters consist 
of the territorial sea and the in-
ternal waters of Indonesia. 
(2) The Indonesian territorial sea 
is a maritime belt of a width of 12 
nautical miles, the outer limit of 
which is measured perpendicular 
to the baselines or points on the 
baselines which consist of straight 
lines connecting the outermost 
points on the low-water mark of 
the outermost islands or part of 
such islands comprising Indo-
nesian territory with the provision 
that in case of straits of a width of 
not more than 24 nautical miles 
the outer limit of the Indonesian 
territorial sea shall be drawn at 
the middle of the strait. 
(3) The Indonesian internal 
waters are all waters lying within 
the baselines mentioned in para-
graph (2). 
* * * * * 
Article 3 
(1) Innocent passage through the 
internal waters of Indonesia is 
open to foreign vessels. 
(2) The innocent passage as men-
tioned in paragraph 1 shall be 
regulated by Government Ordi-
nance (emphasis added) .... 1 
The Government of Indonesia in-
voked three arguments in support of its 
claim: the geographical configuration, 
territorial integrity, and the fact that 
since time immemorial the Indonesian 
Archipelago has constituted one entity. 
As to the first two arguments, they can 
never justify a claim to parts of the sea 
contrary to the general rules of interna-
tional law. The third factor could only 
be an argument if from time im-
memorial the claimed waters had been 
considered as an integral part of the 
archipelago state, and moreover the 
other interested states had acquiesced in 
such a situation. 
The American Embassy at Djakarta, 
on 31 December 1957, acting under 
instructions, delivered a note of protest 
to the Indonesian Foreign Office with 
reference to the Indonesian announce-
ment of 14 December 1957.62 
The Australian Minister for External 
Affairs announced on 15 January 1958 
that the Government of Australia had 
informed the Government of Indonesia 
that Australia would not recognize or be 
bound by Indonesia's announced claim 
to sovereignty over the Java Sea and its 
superjacent airspace.6 3 
On 13 January 1958 the Japanese 
Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Kat-
sumi Ohno, addressed a communication 
to the Indonesian Government reading 
as follows: 
I have the honour to refer to 
Communique issued by the 
Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia on December 13,1957, 
claiming that all waters around, 
between and connecting islands 
belonging to the Indonesian 
Archipelago irrespective of their 
width of dimension form integral 
parts of inland or national waters 
subject to the absolute sover-
eignty of the Republic of Indo-
nesia and also that Indonesian 
territorial sea shall have a width of 
twelve nautical miles measured 
from straight baselines connecting 
the outermost points of the 
islands of the Repuhlie of Indo-
nesia. 
The Government of Japan con-
siders that the claims of the Gov-
ernment of the Repuhlic of Indo-
nesia, regarding internal waters 
and territorial sea as stated in the 
,said Communique can not he ad-
mitted under estahlished interna-
tional law. The Government of 
Japan, therefore, is unahle to 
recognize the validity of such 
claims and will not deem them as 
hinding upon its nationals, vessels 
and aircraft. 64 
Thc Indonesian argument of im-
memorial usage is without foundation 
since the government declaration dates 
only from 13 December 1957 and an 
immemorial claim could only have heen 
hased on prior claims of The Nether-
lands. However, the Dutch made no 
claim to internal waters. As a matter of 
fact the Indonesian declaration specifi-
cally revoked past claims of the Nether-
lands Indies territorial sea since it was 
no longer in accordance with the Indo-
nesian declaration "as it [meaning The 
Netherlands] divides the land territory 
of Indonesia into separate sections, each 
with its own territorial waters. ,,6 5 
The International Law Commission 
in its study on the "Juridical Regime of 
Historic Waters," states that: "Usage, in 
terms of a continued and effective 
exercise of sovereignty over the area hy 
the State claiming it, is then a necessary 
requirement for the estahlishment of a 
historic title to the area hy that 
State. ,>66 
In view of the many protests to the 
unilateral declaration and in the absence 
of effective exercise of sovereignty over 
the area claimed, in the opinion of the 
writer, it cannot he said that the 
claimed national usage has developed 
into an international usage. 
Descrihing the Indonesian concept of 
the inland waters and the right of 
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innocent passage or absence of such a 
right, the official explanation continues 
as follows: 
The inland seas of Indonesia as 
referred to in this clause (Article 
1. C1.3) are all waters situated in 
the inside of the haseline con-
sisting of seas, hays, straits and 
canals. 
Differing from its sovereignty 
over its territorial seas, the sover-
eignty of Indonesia over the 
inland seas is not restricted hy the 
right of innocent passage, though 
Indonesia itself may make restric-
tion of its own hy providing cer-
tain facilities hased on certain 
considerations. 
It is necessary to guarantee sea 
traffic to foreign ships with a view 
to the importance of traffic hy 
ships in the inland sea for our own 
interest as well as for the interest 
of the world community. Differ-
ing from innocent passage hy for-
eign ships in territorial seas which 
is a right recognized hy interna-
tionallaw, innocent passage in the 
inland seas is a facility purposely 
granted by Indonesia. As a conse-
quence of this difference, Indo-
nesia may withdraw the facilities 
granted in the inland seas, whereas 
innocent passage in territorial seas 
hasically cannot he harmed hy a 
maritime state (emphasis 
added).67 
It is clear from the above that it is 
not the intention of Indonesia to honor 
the provision of Indonesian Act No. 4 
of 18 Fehruary 1960 concerning "inno-
cent passage hy foreign vessels through 
the internal waters" of Indonesia. It is 
clear from the Department of Informa-
tion Bulletin quoted ahove that except 
in cases of specific approval the Repuh-
lic of Indonesia intends to prohibit 
passage through the seas around the 
islands of Indonesia when she is physi-
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cally capable of so doing. Her practices 
have also indicated this to be true. 
Some examples of the actions of 
Indonesia evidencing this intent are as 
follows: (1) A decree of the Chief of 
Staff of the Navy of Indonesia, issued at 
Djakarta, 30 August 1958, effective that 
day, announced the closure of territorial 
waters of Halong Bay and part of the 
territorial waters of Ambon Bay. Ex-
cepted were local fishing vessels and 
vessels of the Indonesian Navy. (2) 
Effective 4 December 1958 it was an-
nounced that the territorial waters of 
West Kalimantan had by decree been 
closed. The Indonesian Navy gave 
"security and defense of the State" as 
the reason for the regulation. (3) The 
acting Chief of Staff of the Indonesian 
Navy on 21 September 1959 issued an 
order, effective 17 September 1959, 
prohibiting Dutch vessels from passing 
through Indonesian territorial waters 
excepting by a certain sea route unless 
special permission of the Indonesian 
Navy permitted passage. These incidents 
are discussed in Whiteman, Digest of 
International Law.68 Ambassador Dean, 
in discussing this subject, stated: 
"Through such internal waters there 
would be no right of innocent passage 
except subject to unilateral control, no 
right of submerged navigation and no 
right of aircraft over-flight in the 
absence of express treaty provisions. "69 
Philippines. The Philippine position 
on unilateral declaration of the archipel-
ago concept of waters is based partially 
on the geographic configuration of the 
Philippine Archipelago. The archipelago 
is constituted by a compact and closely 
knit group of islands. It is shaped in the 
form of a triangle, whose three angles 
are represented by the island of Luzon 
in the north, by the island of Palawan in 
the southwest, and by the island of 
Mindanao in the southeast. The islands 
are so situated that a straight baseline 
could be drawn from points in one 
outer island or islet to another without 
traversing a large expanse of water as in 
the case of Indonesia. Inside this tri-
angle are located several seas (the largcst 
of which is the Sulu Sea with an area of 
85,000 square miles of high seas). There 
are approximately 7,100 islands, islets, 
and shoals of different sizes and forma-
tions. 
The geographic and historical con-
cept which the Philippine Govcrnment 
has used in justification for its claim has 
heen explained hy Dr. Juan M. Arrc-
glado, Legal Advisor to the Philippinc 
Department of Foreign Affairs, as fol-
lows: 
It is to be noted in this connec-
tion that when the Philippine 
Islands were ceded hy Spain to 
the United States in accordance 
with the terms and conditions of 
the Treaty of Paris concluded 
hetween the two countries, the 
operative stipulation concerning 
the cession reads in part as fol-
lows: 
Spain cedes to the 
United States the archipel-
ago known as Philippine Is-
lands, and comprehending 
the islands within certain 
lines drawn along specified 
degrees longitude East and 
latitude North. Article ill, 
Treaty of Paris concluded 
hetween the United States 
and Spain on 10 Decemher 
1898. 
This particular prOVISIOn has 
heen interpreted hy some coun-
tries which are opposed to the 
Philippine claim of sovereignty 
over its inter-island waters to the 
effect that the waters compre-
hended within the imaginary lines 
mentioned in the Treaty were not 
included. In other words, they 
sustained the view that only the 
islands were transferred hut not 
the intervening waters. Such inter-
pretation is wholly inaccurate for 
it fails to take into account the 
fact that the term "archipelago" 
as used in the treaty stipulation in 
question is essentially a geo-
graphical concept, more than any-
thing else_ So much so that the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica has de-
fined an "archipelago" as an 
"island-studded sea. " 
* * * 
It follows from the foregoing 
that the term "archipelago" means 
not only the groups of islands 
composing it, but also the waters 
lying in, between, surrounding and 
connecting alI its constituent 
islands; and that there cannot be an 
archipelago without its necessary 
appurtenances of water areas sur-
rounding and connecting the 
islands composing the archipelago_ 
If within the legal, as well as the 
physical, concept of an island the 
surrounding water forms as much a 
part of the island as its terrestrial 
territory, the more so in the case of 
an archipelago, which is composed 
of numerous islands and whose 
only geographical and physical link 
between and among them is the sea 
water_ Hence, by their very physi-
cal nature, geographical location 
and close relationship with the 
islands surrounding them, the sea 
areas around, between and con-
necting the different islands of the 
Philippine Archipelago cannot be 
considered otherwise than as 
necessary appurtenances of its 
land domain. Obviously, the lati-
tudes and longitudes described in 
Article III of the Treaty of Paris 
have particular reference to the 
identification of the islands lo-
cated outside the periphery of the 
Philippine Archipelago but faIling 
within the limits of those 
imaginary lines.7 0 
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According to the notes verbal pre-
sented by the Philippine authorities 
commenting on the draft articles of the 
International Law Commission, the 
Philippine Government seems to delimit 
the territorial waters of the country in a 
somewhat unique manner. In these 
notes it is stated, inter alia: 
..• all waters around, between 
and connecting different islands 
belonging to the Philippine Archi-
pelago irrespective of their widths 
or dimensions, are necessary 
appurtenances of its land terri-
tory, forming an integral part of 
the national or inland waters, sub-
ject to the exclusive sovereignty 
of the Philippines.71 
It is not clear from the above-quoted 
statement whether the large expanse of 
water called the Sulu Sea bordered in 
the east, west, and north by the Philip-
pine Archipelago and in the south by 
North Borneo, and covering tens of 
thousands of square miles of seas, is 
claimed as internal waters by the Philip-
pine authorities. , 
In addition to the "national or inland 
waters," the Philippine authorities, 
according to the above-cited statements, 
further claim that: 
All other water areas embraced 
within the lines described in the 
Treaty of Paris of 10 December 
1898 are considered as maritime 
territorial waters of the Philip-
pines for ... purposes of protec-
tion of its fishing rights, conserva-
tion of its fishery resources, en-
forcement of its revenue and anti-
smuggling as the Philippines may 
deem vital to its national welfare 
and security, of innocent passage 
over those waters. 72 
The lines here referred to are the 
boundaries of the Commonwealth of 
the Philippines as laid down in the 
various conventions mentioned above. 
They are drawn along certain degrees 
longitude east and latitude north. The 
present stand of the Philippine Govern-
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ment seems to be that all the waters 
situated inside these international treaty 
limits are to be considered as the margi-
nal seas of the Philippines. 
It is not known to what extent the 
Philippine authorities recognize that the 
numerous passages between the islands 
and islets of the Philippine Archipelago 
form international straits which under 
international law are open to navigation 
for foreign ships. 
Jorge R. Co quia, a Philippine writer 
on waters of archipelagoes, states in 
part: 
Essentially, an archipelago is a 
body of water studded with 
islands, rather than islands with 
waters. In other words, the waters 
between and around them form 
part and parcel of the territory. 
The delimitation of their water 
areas is therefore entirely dif-
ferent from the territorial waters 
of continental coasts like the 
United States or Australia. Fol-
lowing the traditional rule of the 
delimitation of territorial waters 
of each island would in effect be 
disintegrating an archipelagic state 
itself for there would thus exist a 
regime of high seas in and around 
it. The continuity of the jurisdic-
tion of the government would 
thus be disrupted, for even war-
ships of other states can go about 
the islands, and the state would be 
powerless to drive them out. 73 
Co quia has written advocate posi-
tions for the Philippine Department of 
Justice in support of the Philippine 
Archipelago concept. However, he 
admits in his article in Far Eastern Law 
Review: 
It was very apparent during the 
Conference at Geneva that most 
of the maritime powers would not 
agree to the use of straight base-
lines on archipelagoes on the 
ground that vast areas of the high 
seas which were formerly used 
freely by ships of all states would 
be converted to territorial 
waters. 74 
Stating the position of the United 
States, Delegate Arthur Dean declared 
that if islands are lumped into an 
archipelago, and a straight baseline 
system is used connecting the outermost 
points of such islands, vast areas of the 
high seas formerly used for centuries by 
the ships of all countries are converted 
into territorial waters or possibly into 
internal waters.75 
A note of 12 December 1955 re-
ceived by the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Philippines read: 
The official pronouncement of 
the Government of the Republic 
of the Philippines, as contained in 
its diplomatic notes to various 
countries, is as follows: 
The position of the 
Philippine Government in 
the matter is that all waters 
around, between and con-
necting the different islands 
belonging to the Philippine 
Archipelago irrespective of 
their widths or dimensions, 
are necessary appurtenances 
of its land territory, forming 
an integral part of the 
national or inland waters, 
subject to the exclusive 
sovereignty of the Philip-
pines. All other water areas 
embraced in the imaginary 
lines described in the Treaty 
of Paris of December 10, 
1898 ... are considered as 
maritime territorial waters 
of the Philippines .... 
It is the view of our Govern-
ment that there is no rule of 
international law which defines or 
regulates the extent of the inland 
waters of a state. 7 6 
The Digest of International Law, 
prepared by and under the direction of 
Marjorie M. Whiteman1 Assistant Legal 
Advisor, Department of State, contains 
a statement concerning the United 
States position on the Philippine "his-
torical claim" as follows: 
The United States attitude 
with reference to the position of 
the Philippine Government was 
that the lines referred to in bi-
lateral treaties between the United 
States and the United Kingdom 
and Spain merely delimited the 
area within which land areas be-
long to the Philippines and that 
they were not intended as bound-
ary Jines. The United States, in 
1958, stated that it recognized 
only a 3-mile territorial sea for 
each island.77 
Further statements on the United 
States position on the Philippine uni-
lateral declaration were contained in 
telegram traffic between Washington 
and Manila. One such item, airgram No. 
G-195 of 4 May 1960 from State 
Department files, reads: 
It was reported that Senator 
Arturo M. Tolentino, chief of the 
Philippine delegation to the Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea 
held at Geneva in 1960, had in-
formed a news reporter that no 
protest was registered by any of 
the countries represented at the 
Conference, including the United 
Statcs, to the Philippine position 
and that this meant tacit recogni-
tion of the Philippine claimed 
geographical limits. However on 
April 25, 1960, during the course 
of his address at Conference, the 
United States delegate (Dean), as 
recorded in the Summary Record 
of the Plenary Meeting held at 
9:15 P.M. on that day, stated: 
On various occasions 
speakers had referred to 
treaties to which the United 
States was a Party, and had 
placed interpretations on 
them at variance with the 
official United States posi-
tion and with the facts. 
Other statements had been 
made with respect to mat-
ters not before the Con-
ference which had been con-
trary to official United 
States views. The United 
States delegation had not 
considered it necessary or 
desirable from the stand-
point of orderly debate to 
enter into a discussion of 
ex traneous matters. It 
merely wished to say that. 
its silence was not to be 
construed in any way as 
acquiescence in any views 
stated at the Conference 
which were inconsistent 
with the official position of 
the United States Govern-
ment and already. made 
known, in most instances, 
to the Governments con-
cerned through the diplo-
matic channel. 78 
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The Philippine historical approach to 
the archipelago concept is summarized 
as follows by Max Sorenson, a represen-
tative at the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion: 
It seems quite clear that these 
treaties refer to the islands, that is 
the land territory, and not the 
areas of the sea within the speci-
fied lines. This manner of defining 
the boundaries by longitudes and 
latitudes may have been the only 
practical method in view of the 
immense number of islands and 
could not be interpreted as reveal-
ing any intention to make provi-
sions for the intervening waters 
outside what would otherwise be 
the ordinary limits of territorial 
waters. 
The Constitution of the Philip-
pines, of February 8th, 1935, art. 
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1, defines the national territory 
by referring to these treaties and 
"all territory over which the 
present government of the Philip-
pine Islands exercises jurisdic-
tion." It is a matter of constitu-
tional interpretation whether this 
article comprises the sea areas 
between the islands, but in what-
ever manner it is interpreted, the 
scope of the treaties should not 
give rise to any doubt. 7 9 
V-NATION-STATE PRACTICE 
Practice Concerning Coastal Archi-
pelagoes. The so-called Norwegian sys-
tem for the delimitation of territorial 
waters regards the coastal archipelago as 
the real outer coastline. This practice 
has been supported by the International 
Court of Justice in its Judgment of 18 
December 1951 in the Anglo-Norwegian 
Fisheries Case. The special character-
istics of the Norwegian coastline is of 
particular significance in this system of 
delimitation. The Norwegian coastal 
archipelago consists of some 120,000 
islands, islets, and rocks and extends 
along most of the coast. It must clearly 
be kept in mind that the Norwegian case 
relates to coastal archipelagoes and not 
to outlying or midocean archipelagoes 
such as those of Indonesia and the 
Philippines. The main features of this 
straight baseline system of delimitation 
are as follows: 
(1) A continuous line of straight 
baselines is drawn all along the 
coast. The outermost points of the 
coastal archipelago, including dry-
ing rocks, are used as base points. 
(2) There are no maximum lengths 
for such baselines. Each of them is 
dependent upon the geographical 
configuration of the coastline. 
(3) The baselines follow the gen-
eral direction of the coast. 
(4) There is no connection be-
tween the length of the baselines 
and the breadth of the marginal 
sea. 
(5) The waters inside the base-
lines are considered internal 
waters. Thus, the waters of fjords 
and bays and the waters between 
and inside the islands, islets, and 
rocks of the archipelago are in-
ternal waters. 
(6) The outer limits of the margi-
nal sea are drawn outside and 
parallel to such baselines at the 
distance of four nautical miles in 
the case of Norway. 
Norwegian Fisheries Case-What it 
Means. One of the main questions be-
fore the International Court of Justice 
in its judgment of 18 December 1951 in 
the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case was 
the status of the waters of the coastal 
archipelagoes of Norway. Certain of the 
principles laid down in this case though 
relating to a coastal archipelago situa-
tion will undoubtedly eventually be 
applied to outlying (midocean) archipel-
agoes. 
The Court rejected the British con-
tention regarding the strict coastline 
rule "requiring the coastline to be fol-
lowed in all its sinuosities." The Court 
further stated that the so-called arcs-of-
circles method advocated by the United 
Kingdom "is not obligatory by law." 
The Court expressly rejected the British 
contention to the effect that under 
international law there existed a princi-
ple limiting the length of baselines to 
ten nautical miles. 
The most significant part of the 
decision concerned the status of the 
water within the archipelagoes. It was 
held that inside the straight baselines, 
the area must be regarded as internal 
waters. The result may have been dif-
ferent if the passage between the islands 
had formed a strait.8 0 
State Practice in Archipelagoes in 
General. The following survey is based 
in part on information contained in a 
study conducted by J ens Evensen on 
states' practices in connection with 
treatmen t of archipelagoes81 and from 
Whi ternan, Digest of International 
Law.82 Evensen conducted his study 
for the United Nations in connection 
with the 1958 Conference on the Law 
of the Sea. He was at that time an 
Advocate at the Supreme Court of 
Norway. 
Coastal Archipelagoes. A number of 
nations now follow the general princi-
ples contained in the Anglo-Norwegian 
Fisheries Case or some modification of 
these principles in connection with the 
delimitation of territorial waters of 
coastal archipelagoes. The following are 
examples. 
Norway. By Royal Decrees of 12 
July 1935 and 18 July 1952 the base-
points and baselines have been fixed in 
detail all along the Norwegian coasts. 
There are a total of 123 baselines which 
have been drawn. The longest lines are 
45.5 nautical miles, 44 nautical miles, 
40 nautical miles, and 38.8 nautical 
miles. Fifty more baselines are ten 
nautical miles or more in length. The 
International Court of Justice has held 
that the drawing of these baselines is 
not contrary to international law. 
Iceland. The straight baseline 
system for delimiting territorial waters 
has been applied by Iceland. Forty-
seven consecutive baselines are drawn 
around the coasts of Iceland, enclosing 
the waters of its coastal archipelagoes, 
islands, and rocks within these lines. No 
maximum is stipulated for the lengths 
of baselines. They vary in length accord-
ing to the particular geographic features. 
A four-mile zone of marginal seas is 
drawn outside and parallel to the base-
lines. The waters inside the baselines, 
including the waters inside or between 
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the islands and islets of coastal archipel-
agoes, are considered internal waters. 
Denmark. The waters between 
and inside the Danish coastal archipel-
agoes are considered Danish internal 
waters. Denmark applies straight base-
lines for such delimitations and a ten-
mile maximum for baselines is provided 
for in certain of her regulations and 
decrees. The three main passages to the 
Baltic formed in part or in whole by the 
Danish Archipelagoes are held to be 
international straits. They are open to 
navigation though these waters are situ-
ated between and inside the Danish 
Archipelagoes. 
Sweden. Sweden applies the 
straight baseline system for the delimita-
tion of its territorial waters, enclosing 
within the baselines the waters between 
the islands of a coastal archipelago and 
between the islands and the mainland. 
No maximum has been fixed for the 
length of such baselines. Various lines 
exceed ten nautical miles. However, 
none of these baselines are comparable 
in length to some of the longest lines in 
force along the coastal archipelago of 
Norway or Iceland. A four-mile limit of 
marginal seas is drawn outside and 
parallel to the baselines. The waters 
inside the baselines are internal waters. 
Finland. Finland has one set of 
rules for coastal archipelagoes and one 
for islands too far out at sea to be 
included in the outer coastline. A 
straight baseline system is applied en-
closing the waters of its numerous 
coastal archipelagoes. Finland has estab-
lished maximum length of baselines of 
"twice the breadth of the marginal 
seas." The breadth of Finland's marginal 
seas is four nautical miles. Archipelagoes 
too far out at sea to be included in the 
coastal archipelagoes are also considered 
as a whole, but the baselines are limited 
to a length twice the breadth of margi-
nal seas. As applied to the outlying 
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archipelagoes this is only three nautical 
miles. Consequently, the maximum 
length of baselines in these cases is six 
miles. The waters between and inside 
the islands or islets of Finnish Archipel-
agoes are considered as internal waters. 
Yugoslavia. The coastal archipel-
agoes situated almost all along the outer 
coast of Yugoslavia are considered 
within its outer coastline by drawing of 
straight baselines. 
The belt of marginal seas of six 
nautical miles is drawn outside and 
parallel to these baselines. No express 
maximum is given as to the length of 
baselines. The waters between the 
islands of a Yugoslav coastal archipelago 
and between the islands and the main-
land are considered internal waters. 
Saudi Arabia. Islands and coastal 
archipelagoes have been made part of 
the outer coastline of Saudi Arabia by 
drawing straight baselines. The maxi-
mum length of such baselines is 12 
nautical miles. The waters lying between 
islands, islets and the mainland are 
internal waters. 
Egypt. Egypt provides for straight 
baselines of a maximum length of 12 
nautical miles drawn between the main-
land and islands and from island to 
island, thus including coastal archipel-
agoes within the outer coastline. The 
waters inside such archipelagoes are 
internal waters. 
Cuba. The Cuban Cays extending 
out into the ocean along the Cuban 
mainland are regarded as Cuba's outer 
coastline. 
The straight baseline method of 
measurement for delimitation with re-
gard to coastal archipelagoes has been 
used by the countries discussed above. 
The waters inside such baselines are 
considered internal waters. The coun-
tries therefore consider they have the 
right to close such waters for navigation 
by foreign vessels unless the passage 
concerned is an international strait. 
The United Kingdom, the United 
States, and Australia have taken a dif-
ferent view even as to coastal archipel-
agoes. 
United Kingdom. The Unitcd 
Kingdom has always taken a very strict 
view concerning the archipelagoes ques-
tion. She did not recognize the Nor-
wegian claims to marginal seas following 
straight baselines drawn along the outer-
most points of coastal archipelagoes. 
This matter was decided against the 
United Kingdom in the Fisheries Case. 
Each island had, according to the Eng-
lish view, its own territorial waters. In a 
few exceptional cases the United King-
dom, in dealing with overseas territories, 
has treated groups of islands as a unit. 
J amaiea is a case in point, whereas 
British Honduras is a case where she has 
adhered to the old traditional concept. 
Australia. During the Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries Case it was stated 
that the Barrier Reef-a coastal archipel-
ago situated off Queensland-was sepa-
rated from the mainland by high seas 
beyond the distance of three marine 
miles from low-water mark of the main-
land and the islands respectively. 
United States. The political, 
judicial, and legislative position of the 
United States has been consistent on 
this subject and is discussed in detail in 
other parts of this thesis. This country 
has been one of the staunchest advo-
cates of the view that archipelagoes, 
including coastal archipelagoes, cannot 
be treated in any different way from 
isolated islands where the delimitation 
of territorial waters is concerned. For 
example, the waters of the archipelagoes 
situated outside the coasts of Alaska are 
delimited by each island of the archipel-
agoes being considered as having its own 
marginal sea of three nautical miles. 
Where islands are six miles or less apart 
the marginal seas of such islands will 
intersect Even in this case however, 
straight baselines are not applied for 
such delimitations. 
State Practice Concerning Outlying 
(Midocean) Archipelagoes. Different 
views and approaches unilaterally 
applied in midocean archipelagoes 
have been discussed in connection 
with Indonesia and the Philippines. 
The following concepts are also 
indicated in various other midocean 
archipelagoes. 
The Faeroes. This archipelago is 
situated in the North Atlantic and con-
sists of 18 inhabited islands. Denmark 
and the United Kingdom made an exclu-
sive fishery zones agreement of 22 April 
1955. The Faeroes are treated as a unit 
and the outer limit of territorial waters 
is drawn by means of a mixed system of 
arcs and straight lines. Though the 
straight baseline system is not expressly 
applied, it appears that the agreement 
used the concept from the Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries Case; namely, that 
with heavily indented coastlines the 
outer limits of territorial waters need 
not necessarily follow all the sinuosities 
of the coast, but can be drawn in such a 
manner as to follow the general direc-
tion of the coast 
The Svalbard Archipelago. The 
coastline of this archipelago is heavily 
indented by fjords, bays, and sounds. 
Under the terms of the Spitzbergen 
Treaty of 9 February 1920 it is 
recognized that Norway has sover-
eignty over this archipelago but that 
the contracting parties to the treaty 
are to enjoy equal rights of fishing and 
have equal liberty of access and entry 
to the territorial waters of the archipel-
ago. Norway has not yet laid down the 
limits of the territorial waters of 
Svalbard, but it is assumed that the 
Norwegian Government considers the 
archipelago as a unit 
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Ieeland. Iceland may be properly 
regarded as a mid ocean archipelago. 
Although Iceland has drawn a line of 
straight baselines all along the coast 
from the outermost points, she has not 
applied this approach to the extreme. 
Iceland has not included in this line 
islands lying far out at sea such as the 
islands of Grimsey, Kolbeinsey, and 
Geirfugladrangur. Each of these islands 
has been considered to have its own 
territorial waters. 
The Galapagos. This archipelago 
comprises some 15 larger islands and it 
series of smaller islands. The Govern-
ment of Ecuador considers this archipel-
ago as a unit and delimits its territorial 
waters by drawing straight baselines 
between "the most salient points of the 
outermost islands forming the contour 
of the archipelago of Galapagos." 
The above examples show a number 
of outlying archipelagoes that are 
treated by the respective national au-
thorities as units with regard to the 
delimitation of their territorial waters. 
It is clear that the United States and the 
United Kingdom do not consider their 
insular possessions as units where the 
delimitation of the territorial waters is 
concerned. The Fiji Islands, Cook 




Considerations Concerning Protest 
by Third States. Unilateral claims which 
are not supported by international law, 
such as have been discussed in this 
thesis, must be protested by the mari-
time community of nations to assure 
that these "illegal" claims do not be-
come "legal" ones. It is pointed out by 
Leo J. Bouchez that the first require-
ment for a protest is that it be made by 
the competent authorities of the pro-
testing state. The purpose of a protest is 
the maintenance of rights; in other 
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words, a protest is frequently directed 
against the violation of a right. In this 
case the right is the right of use of the 
high seas. The failure to protest can 
later result in a successful plea of right 
by the claimant state.84 
The special function of a protest 
with reference to the creation of terri-
torial rights was pointed out by Charles 
Hyde when he stated: 
Obviously, a State may actively 
challenge the encroachments of a 
neighbour upon its soil, and by so 
interrupting the continuity of the 
adverse claim, prevent the per-
fecting of a transfer of sovereignty 
that might otherwise result. It is 
believed that a diplomatic protest 
might suffice for that purpose, 
even though unsupported by the 
use of force. 8 5 
For the creation of a historic title, 
the peaceful and continuous exercise of 
rights is the most important element. 
Consequently, a protest is of great 
importance to prevent the establishment 
of a historic title. In support of this 
view the opinion of MacGibbon is of 
interest. He states: "Protest is generally 
accepted by writers as a means of 
preventing the maturin% of a prescrip-
tive or historic title.' 6 He further 
described timely protest as follows: 
It is submitted that a protest, if it 
is prompt, unequivocal and main-
tained, and if it is coupled with 
recourse by the protesting State 
to all other legitimate demonstra-
tions of its will to preserve its 
rights, will suffice to counter ef-
fectively the continuity and the 
peaceful character of a nascent 
prescriptive claim and will prevent 
the creation of any general convic-
tion that the condition of affairs 
is in conformity with interna-
tional order.8 7 
Another important question is the 
moment at which a state has to protest. 
If a state is acquainted with a claim, and 
it is its intention to protest, then it is 
advisable to protest as soon as possible. 
A lasting silence can easily be inter-
preted as acquiescence in, or at least as 
indifference towards, a claim. It is in the 
interest of the state which disapproves 
of a certain claim to protest immedi-
ately after being aware of it, even if an 
effective realization of the claim has not 
yet taken place. 
A protest can be made in writing or 
orally, in either case via diplomatic 
channels. Such a protest, especially 
when made only once, often has not 
more than a formal meaning. Such is 
surely the case when a state after a first 
protest does not show further interest in 
the claim. A diplomatic protest can also 
be made repeatedly; then possible rights 
will be sufficiently safeguarded. 
In the opinion of Bouchez, in rela-
tion to the effectiveness of a protest, 
one has to distinguish between four 
situations: 
(1) a formal protest as such; 
(2) a formal protest followed by 
diplomatic negotiations; 
(3) a formal protest and conduct in 
accordance with the protest; 
(4) the absence of a formal protest, 
but the line of conduct of the protesting 
state clearly expresses a protest.88 
Not only have there been formal 
protests immediately following the 
declarations of Indonesia and the Philip-
pines, but also the lines of conduct of 
the protesting states clearly express ob-
jection to any inclusion of these vast 
areas of the high seas as internal waters 
or territorial seas of the claiming states. 
Certainly it cannot be said that there is 
an acquiescence of the community of 
states in this matter. 
None of the generally accepted tests 
of international law relating to this 
matter have been established by either 
Indonesia or the Philippines. These tests 
were discussed in the case of Civil 
Aeronautics Board v. Island Airlines, 
Inc. (previously reviewed); namely, (1) 
the exercise of authority over the area 
by the state claiming the historic right; 
(2) a continuity of this exercise of 
authority; and (3) that the attitude of 
foreign states be in conformity with the 
claim. 
Conclusions on Status of Archipel-
agoes. It is clear that the prevailing 
opinion at the 1958 Conference favored 
continued customary development of 
prescriptions concerning archipelago 
states. Yugoslavia and the Philippines 
offered proposals, neither stipulating 
any specific limitations upon the 
method of delimitation that might be 
adopted in treating the group as a unit, 
but both were withdrawn. Denmark 
declared in favor of the use of the 
straight-line SYlltem where the lines were 
limited to 15 miles and the waters 
enclosed subject to a right of innocent 
passage; this was supported by Iceland. 
Nevertheless, it was decided, and with 
the apparent acquiescence of the archi-
pelago, states, that the matter required 
"further study. II 
Professor McDougal points out in 
The Public Order of the Oceans that it is 
clear that no consensus has evolved for 
any particular system of delimiting the 
bounds of authority over the waters of 
archipelagic islands. This does not mean, 
however, that archipelago states are free 
to adopt whatever methods they may 
prefer. The declaration of the court in 
the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case that 
"the delimitation of sea areas has always 
an international aspect" would seem 
applicable to this problem as well as to 
other delimitation issues. 89 
The Indonesian declaration of 13 
December 1957 promised the elabora-
tion of the national position on the laws 
of the sea at the Geneva Conference. 
This was indeed done, but with very 
moderate success. 
The principal basis of the Indonesian 
claims, ie., the special regime of an 
archipelago, was not adopted by any of 
the conventions. What is more, some 
deliberate attempts to include a pro-
vision to that effect had to be given up 
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for lack of support. On the other hand, 
no general denunication of the archipel-
ago concept can be found in the conven-
tions. Therefore, this question, like the 
breadth of the territorial sea, constitutes 
one of the remaining problems of inter-
national law. Syatauw points out, how-
ever, that the fact that the Philippines 
are taking more or less' the same posi-
tion as Indonesia and that support was 
given by Yugoslavia, and in a sense also 
by Denmark, proves that there was at 
least some understanding for the Indo-
nesian position. 
It is clear from the above that no 
hard and fast rules exist as to the 
delimitation of the territorial waters of 
archipelagoes. In view of the great 
variety of geographical, historical, and 
economical factors involved, it would 
hardly be feasible, or even desirable, to 
try to lay down hard and fast rules in an 
international convention on archipel-
agoes. In the opinion of the writer it is 
not in the interest of the maritime 
nations to do so. Any changes will not 
be in their interest. This does not mean, 
however, that certain principles do not 
exist. Certainly the principles are clear 
as to coastal archipelagoes. 
VII-RECOMMENDED 
UNITED STATES CONDUCT IN THE 
USE OF ARCHIPELAGIC WATERS 
It has been pointed out above that 
the United States has made repeated 
diplomatic protests to both the Philip-
pine and Indonesian Governments, 
opposing their unilateral actions of en-
croachments on the high seas contrary 
to the accepted principles of interna-
tional law. In addition, due notice has 
been made at the international confer-
ences on the law of the sea by the 
United States and other nations. 
The United States and other nations 
must continue to operate as previously 
in and through the waters involved with 
both merchant and warships, always 
making certain never to request per-
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llllssion to make the transit nor to 
notify the nations involved of our intent 
to transit the waters which we rightly 
contend are areas of the high seas. Use 
of these waters often by units of the 
Navy should be accomplished on every 
convenient occasion. If we should make 
requests for permission to transit the 
claimed area we would be acknowledg-
ing their claims. 
The same procedure of transit 
through airnpace (nonterritorial spaces) 
without notification or by request 
should be accomplished with frequent 
regularity. 
Fortunately, no specific incidents 
have J)een found where any of the 
nations have requested permission from 
Indonesia or the Philippines to transit 
the unilaterally claimed waters. 
There is little doubt that there is an 
international race for grabbing areas of 
the high seas and reducing the freedom 
of movement of navies and merchant 
fleets. This deeply affects the United 
States. 
For many decades the United States 
produced more raw materials than it 
consumed. This is no longer true. It has 
changed from a raw material surplus 
nation to a raw material deficit nation. 
The United States annually spends 
about $6 billion on imports of raw 
material. With 60 percent of all its 
imports in the form of raw and un-
manufactured material, the United 
States has become the worl({'s greatest 
importer. America's imports in the area 
of raw materials are so vital to its 
productive capacity that without them 
its factories would be severely handi-
capped and its defense industries placed 
in dire straits. 90 
The United States is a maritime 
nation whose economy and very ex-
istence depends on the ocean highways 
of the world. Trade and merchant fleets 
have always been important in the 
greatuess of this country. The future of 
the nation depends on the seaborne 
mobile bases that move across the 
oceanic free real estate of the world. 
The American nation is more dependent 
on the oceans of the world than ever 
before. It is strongly in our national 
interest to guard the right of un-
encumbered free transit through the 
highly strategic narrow waters of the 
world such as those of the Indonesian 
and Philippine Archipelagoes. The con-
tinued mobility of the American Navy 
and merchant fleet, unencumbered by 
national encroachment upon the ocean 
highways, is essential to the destiny of 
this nation, of its world leadership 
position, and the well-being of all the 
peoples of the earth. 
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